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Abstract
This paper constructs a simple general equilibriummodel to analyse
the interactions between the ﬁnancial and the real sector in an envi-
ronment where liquidity holdings is an input of the credit/investment
process. The supply of liquidity is constrained in that income pledge-
ability limits inside liquidity, and not all sovereign debt is safe/liquid.
We pin down the determinants of liquidity/collateral premia and bond
spreads, and with reference to the eurozone: (i) the implications of the
ECB’s policies on liquidity provision and credit, and (ii) the debt man-
agement policy that would increase welfare with no need for transfer
payments.
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1 Introduction
Siemens, Europe’s largest engineering group, is setting up its own bank.
As well as broadening its sources of funding, it would allow the company
to deposit cash at the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank.
“Frankly, we’d be happy to get no interest rate just to know our cash is
completely safe” , a person close to the company says. (FT September 2,
2010)
Berkshire Hathaway disclosed its liquidity instruments:
80% of $10.8 billion on non-US Gov. Debt are from Germany, UK,
Canada, Australia and the Netherlands
Comment (Guy LeBas chief ﬁxed income strategist):
"If a ﬁrm is looking at government debt as a source of potential liquid-
ity, then it’s extremely important to remain in these bulletproof nations"
(Bloomberg 27.02.012)
Why don’t these ﬁrms, i.e. the industrial ﬁrm Siemens and the ﬁnancial
ﬁrm Berkshire Hathaway simply use bank deposits as a liquidity instrument?
The key observation is that deposits are bank liabilities and their safety is
constrained by bank income pledgeability and/or by deposit insurance. The
latter being limited to "small" amounts make bank deposits money/liquidity
instruments for households. That is, in Holmstrom and Tirole’s parlance,
"small" deposits, by virtue of deposit insurance, constitute outside liquidity.
By contrast, the degree of safety of large/non-insured deposits is constrained
by the income ﬂows that a bank can credibly pledge as guarantee for its non-
insured liabilities, i.e. the constraints that limit inside liquidity. Moreover,
the further constraint that limits the money/liquidity property of "large"
deposits is the degree of information symmetry and trust required for their
"transferability" — the key ingredient for a money/liquidity instrument.
Siemens and Berkshire Hathaway’s are just an example of the so called
"institutional cash pools", i.e. the large, centrally managed cash balances
of global corporations and institutional investors. Institutional cash pools
have become increasingly prominent since the 1990s as a by product of glob-
alization (see Pozsar, 2011, and with speciﬁc reference to ﬁnancial/banking
corporations Bruno and Shin, 2011). As documented by Pozsar (2011), over
90% of institutional cash pools are subject to written cash investment poli-
cies which govern the investment styles and ﬁduciary responsibilities of their
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managers. In order of priority, the objectives of these policies are: (i) safety
of principal; (ii) liquidity; and (iii) yield. The empirical evidence clearly
shows that institutional cash pools’ preferred habitat is not deposits, but in-
sured deposit alternatives: Government insured securities (government debt
securities) and privately insured money market instruments, such as REPOs
and asset backed commercial paper — where collateral provides safety and
substitutes for government guarantee (Gorton, 2010; Stein, 2010; Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Singh and Stella, 2012)
To sum up, the demand for money/liquidity instruments of corporations,
a large sector of the economy and most active player in the real investment
process and in the money/credit market, is not satisﬁed by M2 types of
money, but rather directly or indirectly (via REPO arrangements) by secu-
rities that meet the requirement of safety of principal and liquidity.
The world’s outstanding stock of safe assets has expanded steadily over
the period 2001-2007, and declined impressively since 2007 (IMF Global
Financial Stability Report, 2012 ch.3). Two asset class lost the safety status:
loan/mortgages-securitization products, ﬁrst, and then the sovereign debt of
the "peripheral" countries of the eurozone. The ﬁrst asset class consists of
private claims on real investments (inside liquidity), the second one consists
of securities issued by governments (outside liquidity). The downgrading
of peripheral debt amounts to a fall of outside liquidity, the evidence is
then of a general decline of the amount of liquidity instruments available for
satisfying the non-household sector’s demand for liquidity.
Moreover, parallel to the observed decline of inside liquidity and the pe-
ripheral debt downgrading is the fall in the yields of the bulletproof nations’
debt (in the eurozone, Germany) and the increase of the yields of peripheral
countries’ debt (e.g. Italian sovereign debt).
This paper constructs a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the
interactions between the ﬁnancial and the real sector in an environment
where liquidity holdings is an input of the credit/investment process. We
build on Holmstrom and Tirole (1998, 2011) which provide a model frame-
work in which liquidity conditions aﬀect investment and asset prices. We
extend their baseline model to incorporate a menu of outside liquidity in-
struments (sovereign bonds) that diﬀer in terms of safety — price ﬂuctuations
and collateral value. The supply of liquidity is then constrained because in-
come pledgeability limits inside liquidity, and because not all sovereign debt
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is safe/liquid. We pin down the determinants of liquidity/collateral premia
and bond spreads, and with reference to the eurozone: (i) the implications of
the ECB policies on liquidity provision and credit, and (ii) the debt manage-
ment policy that would increase welfare with no need for transfer payments.
We borrow from the literature (and from reality) the idea that ﬁrms
and ﬁnancial institutions are best viewed as ongoing entities whose project
completion requires renewed injections of resources.1 Limited pledgeability
of project outcomes constrains the amount of outside ﬁnance that can be
raised and gives rise to the need of hoarding liquid/safe assets to cope with
adverse shocks and/or to take future investment opportunities. In such an
environment, the value of an asset to a ﬁrm is determined by the resources
it gives access to when resources are most valuable — i.e., when projects need
completion and/or further investment-opportunities materialize. Firms are
willing to pay a premium for liquidity: the liquidity beneﬁts amount to the
option value of exercising future investment opportunities that would not
be taken otherwise.
Firms may insure against liquidity needs by securing credit lines from
ﬁnancial institutions; that is, they can contract with a bank for the right
to draw speciﬁc amounts of cash by a given date. Thanks to these arrange-
ments, liquidity to corporations is provided by the bank, while the burden of
liquidity hoarding is on the bank. The bank needs to hold a suﬃcient amount
of liquid assets in order to fund the take-downs that its clients/ﬁrms are en-
titled to make under a credit line/loan commitment. Liquidity provision is
the key activity of banks — the largest share of commercial and industrial
loans are take-downs under loan commitments — credit lines (Bhattacharya
and Thakor, 1993; Strahan, 2008). During the ﬁnancial crisis, banks holding
assets with low market liquidity (e.g. mortgage-backed securities, and asset
backed securities) increased their holdings of liquid assets and lowered their
liquidity provision to ﬁrms — new commitments to lend shrunk (Cornett et
al., 2011).
The intimate relation between banks’ liquidity provision and liquid as-
sets holdings makes the availability of safe/liquid assets at the center of the
credit/investment process. We focus on outside liquidity and, with some
1Corporations’ concern for reﬁnancing is emphasized in various contexts by the ﬁ-
nance literature — Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum (1981), and Froot, Scharfstein, and
Stein (1993), among others.
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reference to the eurozone, we allow for two types of government debt, one
being perfectly safe has a non-volatile market price, while the other being
risky has a volatile market price (Section 2). We derive ﬁrms’/banks’ com-
position of liquid asset portfolios and real investment/credit-lines provision,
given asset/bond prices, and then solve for the equilibrium values of gov-
ernment bonds’ prices, the associated liquidity/collateral premia and bond
spreads, aggregate investment/credit and return on capital (Section 3). We
ﬁnd that: i) credit expansion, real investment and return on capital are in-
creasing functions of the amount of liquid assets, the reverse holds for liquid-
ity/collateral premia and bond spreads; ii) the bond spread is largely driven
by the liquidity/collateral premium, and the impact of a bond’s volatility
on bond spread is more relevant when liquidity is tight than when liquidity
is abundant; that is, how an asset behaves when liquidity is abundant is
less relevant than how it behaves when liquidity is tight; iii) the share of
safe/liquid assets is constant (in line with the empirical evidence provided
by Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick, 2012). Liquid assets’ availability is deter-
mined by the amount of sovereign bonds outstanding and crucially by the
volatility of their market values. An increase in market-value volatility of a
bond induces a substitution away from that bond and the macro eﬀect of
depleting the amount of assets that are eligible for satisfying liquidity needs,
and for suﬃciently high volatility, the bond loses the status of liquid asset
(it’s excluded from asset holdings for liquidity purposes).
We then use the model to analyze the implications of the ECB policies
(lending facility and deposit facility) on ﬁrms’/banks’ liquidity needs, liquid-
ity availability and credit. In our model, the relevant aspects of the lending
facility are the eligible collateral (the assets that can be pledged) and the
haircuts. Its eﬀectiveness relies on haircuts lower than the market ones,
which implicitly amounts to subsidizing the sector that can access the facil-
ity (i.e. banks). There are, however, positive externalities on non-ﬁnancial
corporations, via market prices, as well as reduction of bond spreads. The
deposit facility brings potentially a further safe/liquid asset in the economy,
albeit available only to banks. We ﬁnd that, by contrast to common wis-
dom, pursuing credit expansion as well as bond spreads reduction requires
increasing the deposit facility rate rather than deposit-rate cuts, and possi-
bly the transferability of these claims — ECB debt certiﬁcates (Section 4).
The increase in the deposit-facility rate and/or ECB debt certiﬁcates suc-
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ceed in expanding credit and aggregate investment in that they de facto
expand the availability of safe assets, and thus lower the cost of holding
liquidity (the key input of the credit/investment process). The drawback
is the increase in the market yields of government debt, which means an
increase in sovereign cost of debt. There is however a policy that does not
have these drawbacks and does not involve the subsidization which under-
lines the eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s lending policies. It amounts to insulate
the safe part of the sovereign risky debt — tranching the debt so as to create
a security whose safeness is ensured by suﬃcient collateral (real assets and
tax revenue).2 Such a policy increases welfare and beneﬁts the issuer by
reducing its cost of debt (Section 5).
Related Literature. As anticipated, our paper builds on Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998, 2011) which provide a model framework in which liquid-
ity conditions aﬀect investment and asset prices. We extend their base-
line model to incorporate a menu of outside liquidity instruments (sovereign
bonds) that diﬀer in terms of safety — price ﬂuctuations and collateral value.
Our focus is on the joint determination of ﬁrms’/banks’ composition of liquid
asset portfolios, real investment/credit-lines provision, liquidity/collateral
premia and bond spreads.
The role of government bonds in facilitating credit/investment has been
emphasized by several papers and relies on contractual frictions that limit
borrowers’ commitment to honor (unsecured) debt obligations. The most
closely related paper is Bolton and Jeanne (2011) that analyses the role
for government debt securities as collateral for borrowing. The safer is the
government debt, the greater investment and credit. The key assumption
is the asynchronicity between resource availability and real investment op-
portunities (as in Woodford, 1990). Non pledgeability of investment returns
prohibits unsecured borrowing, real investment undertaking relies on trans-
ferring resources into the future by investing resource endowments in gov-
ernment bonds that can be used as collateral for secured borrowing. The
safer the government debt, the greater the amount of secured borrowing
2The importance of secured/collateralized government debt for a sounder euro area
monetary system is emphasized by Nyborg (2011). The euro-nomics group (2011) points
out the vital importance of a European safe asset for the long run survival of the euro-zone
and calls for the creation of European Safe Bonds, where safeness is provided by pooling
the sovereign bonds and then tranching the pooled debt so as to create a security whose
safeness is ensured by suﬃcient collateral.
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that can be raised and the investment that can be attained. In a multi
country world, safe debt is a public good and selﬁsh governments will sup-
ply a socially sub-optimal amount of safe debt. Our paper diﬀers in several
respects, by contrast to Bolton and Jeanne, we consider ﬁrms and ﬁnan-
cial institutions as ongoing entities whose investment projects completion
requires renewed injections of resources: ﬁrms deﬁne the investment scale
and the bond portfolio holdings in anticipation that further resources will
have to be invested in order for projects to generate returns. The larger the
amount of assets that are eligible for satisfying liquidity needs, the larger
the scale of investment, the lower liquidity premia and bond spreads. An
increase in market-value volatility of a bond induces a macro eﬀect of de-
pleting the amount of assets that are eligible for satisfying liquidity needs,
and a substitution away from that bond. For suﬃciently high volatility,
the bond loses the status of liquid asset (it’s excluded from asset holdings
for liquidity purposes). By contrast, In Bolton and Jeanne a volatile/risky
bond always enters in a portfolio, since it allows increasing the investment
size in the (risky-debt) no-default state. They analyse various forms of ﬁscal
integration that can mitigate the incentives to under supply safe debt and
ﬁnd that they reduce the welfare of the country that provides the “safe-
haven” asset. We focus on debt management and ﬁnd that insulating the
safe part of the sovereign risky debt — tranching the debt so as to create
a security whose safeness is ensured by suﬃcient collateral (real assets and
tax revenue) — increases welfare and beneﬁts the issuer by reducing its cost
of debt.
2 The Model
There are three periods t = 0, 1, 2. Agents (ﬁnal investors) are risk neutral
and evaluate consumption streams according to
U(c0, c1, c2) = E (c0 + c1 + c2) , (A1)
that is, agents’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) is equal
to 1. Each agent receives a resource endowment at each date, and this is suf-
ﬁciently large to ensure that resource scarcity does not limit the investment
scale, this will be constrained by contractual frictions (limited pledgeability)
and safe assets’ scarcity, not by resource scarcity.
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Assets
We assume that the storage technology (holding cash under the mattress)
is prohibitively costly, purchasing power can be transferred into the future
by investing in securities. These consist of securities issued by ﬁrms/banks
to be discussed below, and of sovereign debt: G government debt and I
government debt.
The sovereign debt’s unit price at date 0 is denoted qi, the total amount
outstanding is Bi, i = G, I.
The G bonds are safe. G’s unit value at date 1 is one for sure. The I
bonds are "risky", I’s unit value at date 1 is α with probability p, and α
> α with probability 1− p.
For simplicity, we assume that in expected value the two government
bonds are identical:
αp+ α (1− p) = 1 (A2)
The two bonds diﬀer only in the volatility of their interim-date 1 value,
this is nil only for the G bonds.
The I bond’s volatility may result from the volatility of the feasible tax
revenue, possibly due to a high level of I sovereign debt outstanding relatively
to the tax base (GDP). The smaller α, the greater the I bond’s volatility
(by (A2)).
We deﬁne the liquidity/collateral premium on government bond i as the
excess payment made at date 0 for this bond relatively to its date 1 expected
value, that is qi − 1, i = G, I.
At an equilibrium:
qI ≥ 1, qG ≥ 1
(qI < 1, qG < 1 are ruled out by (A1) and (A2)). That is, liquidity premia
cannot be negative.
Securities can be used as collateral for borrowing. We shall assume that
the fraction that can be raised per unit of collateral value is less than one,
the diﬀerence 0 < h < 1 is the "haircut".
Firms/banks
There are N ﬁrms/banks. They are risk-neutral and evaluate consump-
tion streams according to (A1). A ﬁrm/bank i, i = 1, ..N, has initial net
worth Ai at date 0 and no endowment in future periods. For simplicity, all
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ﬁrms/banks face the same investment opportunity that requires injections of
resources at date 0 and at date 1 and delivers returns at date 2. Speciﬁcally,
at date 0, i chooses the size of investment Ii; this deﬁnes the amount of
resources to be invested by i at date 0. At date 1, the funds to be injected
amount to θ per unit of investment. At the ﬁnal date 2, the return y per unit
of investment obtains, the possibility of funds diversion and/or bankruptcy
costs limits return pledgeability. The per-unit-investment return which is
pledgeable is r < y; r deﬁnes the amount of outside ﬁnancing that can be
raised per unit of investment. The non-pledgeable return, R ≡ y − r, is the
haircut that market participants apply in extending loans backed by real
investment. We assume:
y > 1 + θ (A3)
θ > r ≡ y −R (A4)
That is, investment projects are positive in net present value (by (A3)), but
the limited pledgeability of project returns coupled with the reinvestment
need at date 1 requires liquidity holdings of amount S ≡ θ − r > 0 per
unit of investment (by (A4)). The greater non-pledgeability/haircut R, the
greater liquidity needs S.
The above is a reduced form of two possible models. One, simply refers
to a ﬁrm that faces a constant-to-scale real investment opportunity which
requires one unit of resources at date 0, and θ at date 1, per unit of in-
vestment. For a given investment size Ii chosen at date 0, the reinvestment
needs at date 1 amount to θIi. Since pledgeable income is rIi < θIi, rein-
vestment (project completion) will be feasible only if i′s liquidity holdings
at date 1 does not fall below SIi.
An alternative, and prominent, case refers to i being a bank endowed
with net worth (capital) Ai which faces a continuum of borrowers/ﬁrms.
Each borrower has an investment opportunity that requires one unit at date
0 and, with probability λ, σ additional units at date 1. The bank at date 0
chooses the size of its credit-lines’ portfolio Ii, where a credit line allows a
bank’s borrower to withdraw one unit at date 0 and σ units at date 1. By
pooling borrowers’ liquidity needs, at date 1 the bank will face withdrawals
of total amount λσIi. Reinterpreting θ as θ ≡ λσ, then under the maintained
assumption that the income per unit of project that is pledgeable to outsiders
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is r, the bank will be able to satisfy borrowers’ liquidity needs (i.e, the credit
lines withdrawals) only if its liquidity holdings at date 1 does not fall below
SIi. If i is a bank, then Ii deﬁnes the amount of credit extended by i; that
is, the scale of investment originated by i.
We shall refer to BG+αBI as the volume of assets eligible for satisfying
liquidity needs, and assume:
BG + αBI <
S
N
i=1
Ai
1 + S
(A5)
This will imply strictly positive liquidity/collateral premia. To simplify
the analysis we also assume:
R > 1 + S


N
i=1
Ai −
BG
S
BG

 (A6)
where the expression in squared brackets is greater than 1 (by (A5)). As-
sumption (A6) will imply that at equilibrium all ﬁrms/banks are active (in-
vest) — conditionally upon N ﬁrms/banks being active, the return on capital
exceeds IMRS. Henceforth,

denotes the summation form 1 to N .
2.1 Liquidity Demand and Investment Choice
Limited pledgeability of real investment return implies that liquidity must
be planned in advance. At date 0, ﬁrm/bank i chooses its liquid assets
portfolio: the amount of G government bonds, LGi , and the amount of I
government bonds, LIi . The value of I government bond holdings at date
1 will depend on the state realization: in state α the value is αLi, in state
α the value is αLi. Therefore, for a given bond portfolio
	
LIi , L
G
i


and real
investment size Ii the date 1 state-contingent liquidity held and that needed
are as in Table 1
Table 1
State
Liquidity
held
Liquidity
needs
α αLIi + L
G
i SIi
α αLIi + L
G
i SIi
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The percentage of the bond portfolio revenue that is pledgeable is 1−h,
accordingly for investors to be willing to supply funds to bank/ﬁrm i the
following participation constraint must be satisﬁed:
Ii + qIL
I
i + qGL
G
i −Ai ≤
(1− h)

p
	
αLIi + L
G
i − SIi


+ (1− p)
	
αLIi + L
G
i − SIi


(PC)
S ≡ θ − r
the LHS of (PC) is the amount of outside ﬁnancing required for real invest-
ment, Ii, and liquid assets holdings
	
LIi , L
G
i


(i.e., the diﬀerence between
total expenditure, Ii+qIL
I
i +qGL
G
i , and inside funds/capital Ai). The RHS
is the ﬁrm/bank’s pledgeable income: the fraction 1 − h of the expected
value of date 1 idle liquidity (i.e., the expected value of the bond portfolio
at date 1 net of the amount absorbed by investment-project completion).
The ﬁrm/bank’s expected proﬁts are given by its non-pledgeable income;
that is, the non-pledgeable return (haircut) on real investment, RIi, plus the
expected value of the non-pledgeable date 1 idle liquidity:
RIi + h

p(αLIi + L
G
i − SIi) + (1− p)(αL
I
i + L
G
i − SIi)

.
These proﬁts will obtain provided the ﬁrm/bank at date 1 holds suﬃcient
liquidity so as to meet the reinvestment needs (credit lines withdrawals),
that is if
αLIi + L
G
i ≥ SIi .
We rule out government bond short-selling by imposing
LIi ≥ 0 , L
G
i ≥ 0 , ∀i
The ﬁrm/bank’s optimization problem amounts to choose the real in-
vestment size Ii, and its government bond portfolio
	
LIi , L
G
i


so as to max-
imize its proﬁts subject to the investor participation constraint, the liquid-
ity/reinvestment constraint and the no-short-selling constraints:
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Max
Ii,L
I
i ,L
G
i

Πi ≡ RIi + h

p(αLIi + L
G
i − SIi) + (1− p)(αL
I
i + L
G
i − SIi)

st
Ii+qIL
I
i+qGL
G
i ≤ Ai+(1− h)

p

αLIi + L
G
i − SIi

+ (1− p)

αLIi + L
G
i − SIi

(PC)
αLIi + L
G
i ≥ SIi (LC’)
LIi ≥ 0 , L
G
i ≥ 0 (NNC)
At an optimum, the liquidity constraint (LC′) binds,
αLIi + L
G
i = SIi , (LC)
if not then the ﬁrm/bank would beneﬁt by reducing the bond portfolio size
so as to eliminate idle liquidity. This would free up h units of capital per unit
of idle-liquidity reduction and thereby expand real investment and proﬁts.
Hence at an optimum, the date 1 state-contingent idle liquidity is as in Table
2.
Table 2
State Idle Liquidity prob
α αLIi + L
G
i − SIi ≡ 0 p
α
αLIi + L
G
i − SIi
≡ (α− α)LIi
1− p
Using I bonds for liquidity purposes entails holding (α− α) units of date
1 idle liquidity with probability 1 − p, and zero units with the residual
probability, per unit of I bond. The certain equivalent of this lottery is
(1− α) (because of risk neutrality, and by (A2)).
Observation 1: I bond holdings entails a ﬁnancial investment that
yields (1− α) units of date 1 idle liquidity per bond.
The greater I bond volatility, i.e., the lower α, the greater the date 1
idle liquidity per unit of I bond holdings. Date 1 idle liquidity is partially
pledgeable — the amount of outside ﬁnancing that can be raised per unit is
1−h, the residual fraction (haircut) h is ﬁnanced with inside capital. I bond
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holdings then entails an unwarranted ﬁnancial investment that subtracts
resources to real investment undertaking.
Substituting (LC) into the investor participation constraint (which at
an optimum holds with equality) and using the identity (1− p) (α− α) ≡
(1− α) gives the size of investment Ii:
Ii =
Ai + L
I
iZ
1 + qGS
(1)
Z ≡ [1 + α (qG − 1)]− [qI + h (1− α)] (2)
As we will see, a positive haircut, h > 0, implies that at equilibrium Z < 0;
using the I bonds for liquidity purposes lowers real investment. As observed
above, positive holdings of the I bonds entails an investment in date 1 idle
liquidity ( (1− α) per unit of I bond). The amount of outside ﬁnancing that
can be raised per unit of date 1 idle liquidity is 1−h, which implies that the
ﬁrm/bank invests h (1− α) units of its own capital for each unit of I bond
holdings. Real investment falls accordingly.
The ﬁrm/bank’s expected proﬁts are
Πi = RIi + h (1− α)L
I
i
that is:
Πi = ρAi + [ρZ + h (1− α)]L
I
i
ρ ≡
R
1 + qGS
.
ρ is the return per unit of capital devoted to real investment. At equi-
librium, ρ ≥ 1 (by (A1))
Let qI (qG) be given by:
∂Πi
	
LIi , qG, qI

∂LIi
= 0
⇐⇒ ρZ (qG, qI) + h(1− α) = 0
that is:
qI (qG) ≡ [1 + α (qG − 1)]− h (1− α)ρ− 1
ρ

(3)
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Lemma 1: The I bonds are used for liquidity purposes, LIi > 0, if and
only if qI ≤ qI (qG), and for qI < qI (qG), the G bonds are excluded from
liquidity holdings.
This follows because
qI > qI (qG) −→ ∂Πi
∂LIi
< 0 : (LIi = 0, L
G
i = SIi)
qI < qI (qG) −→ ∂Πi
∂LIi
> 0 : (LIi =
SIi
α
,LGi = 0)
qI = qI (qG) −→ ∂Πi
∂LIi
= 0 : (LIi > 0, L
G
i = SIi − αL
I
i > 0)
Lemma 2: The threshold qI (qG) is decreasing in I bond’s volatility and
in non-pledgeability/haircut h. And
qI (qG)− qG ≡ − (1− α) (qG − 1) + hρ− 1
ρ

< 0
At equilibrium, qI (qG)−qG < 0 because ρ ≥ 1 , qG ≥ 1 (by (A1)-(A2)). For
the I bonds to be used as liquidity instruments it must be that qI ≤ qI (qG),
and qI (qG) is decreasing in I bond’s volatility (the inverse of α) and in non-
pledgeability/haircut h. It then follows that, for any given level of the G
bond price qG, the greater I bond volatility and/or non-pledgeability/haircut
h, the smaller the price qI such that I bonds are used for liquidity purposes.
The key point is that the greater the volatility, the greater date 1 idle liq-
uidity per unit of volatile asset holdings — the greater 1 − α. And with
limited pledgeability, i.e.,for h > 0, the greater the forgone amount of real
investment return.
It follows from Lemma 2 that if the volatile I bonds are used as liquidity
instruments, i.e., if qI ≤ qI (qG), then necessarily they sell at a discount with
respect to the safe G bonds. Bond prices are bounded below by 1 — that is,
qI ≥ 1, qG ≥ 1 (by (A1), (A2)). Then, for suﬃciently high levels of volatility
and/or haircut h, such that qI (qG) < 1, the I bonds will be excluded from
asset holdings, LIi = 0, and held by "buy and hold" investors.
3 Equilibrium: Aggregate Investment, Bond Prices
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and Spreads
We ﬁrst observe that the safe G bonds are used for liquidity purposes:
Lemma 3: At an equilibrium, necessarily qI ≥ qI (qG): the G bonds are
demanded for liquidity purpose, LG > 0
Proof : By contradiction: Suppose qI < qI (qG) and therefore LG = 0,
i.e., the G bonds are held entirely by "buy and hold investors". Then qG = 1,
ρ = R1+S , and qI (qG) = 1− h (1− α) R−(1+S)R  < 1 (because R > 1+ S, by
(A3)), which contradicts qI < qI (qG) since qI ≥ 1 (by (A1), (A2)) 
Moreover, the G bonds carry a strictly positive liquidity premium:
Lemma 4 At equilibrium the liquidity premium on the G bonds is strictly
positive — the amount of G bonds outstanding is absorbed entirely by the
demand for liquidity.
Proof : At an equilibrium qI ≥ qI (qG) (by Lemma 3), then it amounts
to proving that for qI ≥ qI (qG), qG > 1. This follows because:
a) if at equilibrium qI = qI (qG), then qG = qIR−(1−α)[(1−h)R+h]αR+h(1−α)S > 1, by
qI ≥ 1, α < 1, h > 0 and R > 1 + S (by A3).
b) if at equilibrium qI > qI (qG), then Li = 0, Ii = Ai1+qGS . That is,
liquidity is provided exclusively by the G bonds and the aggregate demand
for G bonds is

LGi = S

Ii ≡
S

Ai
1+qGS
. Aggregate demand

LGi is
decreasing in qG, and
S

Ai
1+S > B
G (by (A5)), then the G bonds’ market
clearing necessarily implies that qG > 1. 
To sum up. At equilibrium, either:
i) qI > qI (qG), in which case Li = 0, ∀i. Liquidity is provided exclusively
by the G bonds and therefore the amount of assets that are eligible for
satisfying liquidity needs is limited to the amount of G bonds outstanding
BG, or;
ii) qI = qI (qG). Both bonds provide liquidity and therefore the amount
of assets that are eligible for satisfying liquidity needs expands to BG+αBI .
In any case, the amount of G bonds outstanding is absorbed entirely by
the demand for liquidity, that is the G-bonds market clears for

LGi = B
G.
The equilibrium, aggregate investment, credit, return on capital, bond
prices and spreads, depends on the amount of government bond outstand-
ing, BG, BI , and crucially on the volatility of the I bond value (the inverse
of α) and the degree of securities’ non-pledgeability/haircut h. This deﬁnes
the opportunity cost of the ﬁnancial investment in date 1 idle liquidity that
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the I bonds entail (Observation 1). Would h be nil, then the opportunity
cost of holding date 1 idle liquidity would be nil - the amount of outside
ﬁnancing raised per unit of date 1 idle liquidity would be one, and no capital
would be subtracted to real investment undertaking.
Observation 2. With perfect pledgeability, h = 0, date 1 idle liq-
uidiy is costless. The entire amount of I bond outstanding is used for
liquidity purposes, and bond prices are: q∗I = qI (q∗G) ≡ 1 + α (q∗G − 1);
q∗G =

Ai−
(BG+αBI)
S
BG+αBI
. The liquidity premium is l ≡ q∗G − 1, and bond
spread
q∗G − q
∗
I = (1− α) l
Aggregate investment and credit are determined by the aggregate quantity of
safe assets, BG + αBI , 
I =
BG + αBI
S
Proof : At equilibrium qI ≥ qI (qG), qG > 1, LGi = BG (by Lemmas
3-4). And for h = 0, qI (qG) ≡ 1 + α (qG − 1) > 1 (by qG > 1). Then
necessarily Li > 0, that is qI = qI (qG), and LIi = BI . If not, then
the I bonds would be held, at least partially, by "buy and hold" investors.
Since these value securities according to the underlying fundamental value,
the I bond price would be qI = 1 which contradicts qI ≥ qI (qG). Thus,
at equilibrium, necessarily: qI = qI (qG), and LIi = BI . Since LGi +
αLIi = SIi (by (LC)), bond markets clear for S

Ii = BG + αBI , where
Ii =
Ai
1+qGS
(because Z = 0, by h = 0, and qI = qI (qG)). Thus, q∗G :
S

Ai
1+qGS
= BG + αBI , that is q∗G =

Ai−
(BG+αBI)
S
BG+αBI
(> 1, by (A5)). 
With perfect pledgeability, h = 0, one unit of date 1 idle liquidity allows
to raise exactly one unit of date 0 liquidity. An I bond is then exactly
equivalent to a bundle of α units of G bonds, and 1 − α units of date 0
liquidity. This bundle costs αq∗G + (1 − α), and so does an I bond. The
amount of assets eligible for satisfying date 1 liquidity needs is BG + αBI
and this determines the amount of aggregate investment/credit. The greater
I bond volatility (the lower α), the lower the aggregate amount of safe/liquid
assets, the greater the liquidity premium (l ≡ q∗G − 1) and the greater bond
spread (q∗G − q
∗
I ).
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We now derive the equilibrium under the assumption of imperfect pledge-
ability, h > 0 — date 1 idle liquidity is costly, it subtracts capital to real
investment undertaking (proﬁts shrink). For suﬃciently high volatility, the
I bond will be excluded from asset holdings for liquidity purposes.
Suppose that at equilibrium qI > qI (qG), i.e., LIi = 0, LGi = SIi (by
(LC)), and all ﬁrms/banks are active (invest), then the aggregate demand
for the G bonds is

LGi = S

Ii, and aggregate investment is

Ii =
 Ai
1 + qGS
bond prices are:
q∗I = 1 (by Li = 0,∀i, and by (A1) , (A2)) (4)
q∗G :

LGi ≡ S

Ii = B
G
that is
q∗G =

Ai −
BG
S
BG
(> 1 by (A5)) (5)
Firm/bank i’s proﬁts:
Πi = RIi ≡

R
1 + q∗GS

Ai , (6)
The return on capital ρ ≡ R1+q∗
G
S exceeds IMRS, i.e. ρ > 1 (by (A6)).
3
This is an equilibrium if q∗I = 1 > qI (q∗G), that is if
q∗G < Q
Q ≡
α+ h (1− α)
	
1− 1
R


α+ h (1− α) SR
(7)
Q > 1, because α < 1, h > 0, R > 1+S, is increasing in I bond volatility
(decreasing in α) and in non-pledgeability/haircut h.
3 If (A6) fais to hold, then, at equilibrium, n∗ ﬁrms/banks are active, where n∗ < N is
the smallest integer such that R−1
S
≥ q∗G ≡
n
∗
i=1
Ai−
B
G
S
BG
(i.e. ρ ≥ 1).
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Using (5), the condition for an equilibrium where liquidity is provided
exclusively by the G bonds is
Q >

Ai −
BG
S
BG
(C1)
The more volatile the I bond value (the lower α) and/or the greater non-
pledgeability/haircut h, the greater Q. The larger the amount of G bonds
outstanding, the smaller the RHS of (C1),the more likely then an equilibrium
where the I bonds are not used for liquidity purposes. This leads to:
Proposition 1: If the I bond value’s volatility and/or non-pledgeability/haircut
h are suﬃciently high so that condition (C 1) holds, then the assets that are
eligible for satisfying liquidity needs are deﬁned exclusively by G government
bonds: q∗G > 1, q
∗
I = 1. The liquidity premium is l ≡ q
∗
G − 1, bond spread
q∗G − q
∗
I = l
Aggregate investment and credit are restrained by the amount of G bonds
outstanding: 
Ii =
BG
S
Liquidity seeking institutions require a price discount for the unwar-
ranted investment in date 1 idle liquidity which an I bond entails. The
higher volatility (the lower α), the greater the date 1 idle liquidity per unit
of I bond, and the higher the haircut the higher the opportunity cost of
the idle liquidity. The greater then the price discount required for using
the I bonds for liquidity purposes. If volatility and/or the haircut are suf-
ﬁciently high so that condition (C1) holds, then the price at which the I
bond would be used as liquidity instrument, the threshold qI (qG), falls be-
low the I bond’s underlying fundamental value (which is 1). The I bonds
will be held entirely by "buy and hold" investors and liquidity needs will be
met exclusively by the G bonds. Aggregate investment and credit will then
be restrained by the amount of G bonds outstanding. The smaller this is,
the greater the liquidity/collateral premium and bond spread, the smaller
aggregate investment and ﬁrms’/banks’ proﬁts (by (5)− (6)).
If the volatility of the I bond value and/or non-pledgeability/haircut
h lower suﬃciently so that condition (C1) is violated, then at equilibrium
qI = qI (qG), i.e. LIi > 0, ∀i. The I bond will be used for liquidity holdings
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and the availability of the assets eligible for satisfying liquidity needs will
expand to BG+αBI . While the entire amount of G bonds outstanding will
be used for liquidity purposes,

LGi = B
G (by Lemma 4), the same will not
necessarily hold for the I bonds. We show below that if (C1) fails to hold,
at equilibrium either

LIi = B
I , and qI > 1 (the I bonds carry a liquidity
premium), or 0 <

LIi < B
I , and qI = 1.
Suppose the entire amount of the I bonds outstanding is used for liquidity
purposes, then, since LGi = SIi − αL
I
i (by (LC)), bond markets clear for:
LGi ≡ S

Ii − α

LIi = B
G

LIi = B
I
where:

Ii =
ZBI +

Ai
1 + qGS
(by (1) and

LIi = B
I) (8)
and since qI = qI(qG),
Z = −(1− α)h

1 + qGS
R

. (9)
The bond market clearing condition is then S

Ii = B
G+αBI , that is:
S

ZBI +

Ai
1 + qGS

 = BG + αBI .
This gives bond prices:
q∗G =

Ai −
(BG+αBI)
S −
h
R(1− α)B
I
BG + αBI + hS
R
(1− α)BI
, (10)
q∗I = qI(q∗G)
≡
1 + α (q∗G − 1)− h (1− α)

ρ−1
ρ

ρ ≡ R1+q∗
G
S .
(11)
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Firm/bank i′s proﬁts:
Πi = RIi + h (1− α)L
I
i
≡

R
1+q∗
G
S

Ai
(by (1), and (9)). The return on capital ρ ≡ R1+q∗
G
S exceeds IMRS (by
(10) and (A6)).
This is an equilibrium if bond prices satisfy q∗G ≥ 1, q
∗
I ≥ 1 which
amounts to
q∗G ≥ Q ( > 1, by (7) )
and holds iﬀ:
Q ≤

Ai −
(BG+αBI)
S
− h
R
(1− α)BI
BG + αBI + hSR (1− α)B
I
(C2)
This leads to:
Proposition 2 If the volatility of the I bond value and/or non-pledgeability/haircut
h are suﬃciently small so that condition (C1) is violated, then the I bonds
are used for liquidity purposes. And if the aggregate quantity of safe assets
BG + αBI is suﬃciently small so that condition (C 2) holds, then the out-
standing volumes of both G and I bonds are absorbed entirely by the demand
for liquidity. The liquidity premium is l ≡ q∗G − 1, and bond spread
q∗G − q
∗
I = (1− α)

l

1−
hS
R

+ h

1−
S + 1
R

Aggregate investment and credit are determined by the aggregate quantity of
safe assets, BG + αBI : 
I =
BG + αBI
S
The smaller the quantity of safe assets, BG + αBI , the greater the liq-
uidity premium and bond spread. Moreover, the bond spread, q∗G − q
∗
I , is
increasing in non-pledgeability/haircut h and in the volatility of the I bonds.
The key is that an increase in volatility (a reduction of α) produces two ef-
fects: i) a depletion of the aggregate amount of safe/liquid assets, BG+αBI ,
and; ii) an increase in the unwarranted investment in date 1 idle liquidity
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that each unit of I bond holdings entails. Eﬀect i) pushes up the market
price for liquidity and thereby the G bond price, q∗G. Eﬀect ii) increases the
price discount that liquidity seeking institutions require for I bond holdings.
The higher the haircut h, the higher the opportunity cost of idle liquidity
and the greater the discount (by Lemma 2). The greater I bond volatility
and/or the haircut h, the greater then bond spread.
If both (C1) and (C2) fail to hold, i.e. if
Ai −
(BG+αBI)
S −
h
R(1− α)B
I
BG + αBI + hS
R
(1− α)BI
< Q ≤

Ai −
BG
S
BG
(C3)
then at equilibrium the I bonds are used only partially for liquidity purposes,
0 <

LIi < B
I , which implies that q∗I = 1, and since q
∗
I = qI (q∗G) ,
q∗G = Q (12)
Aggregate investment:

I =
	
A+ ZLI


1 +QS
Z ≡ − (1− α)h

1 +QS
R

(by q∗I = qI (q∗G) , and (12))
which implies that ∂Πi(..)
∂LIi
= 0, and i′s proﬁts are
Πi = RIi + h (1− α)LIi
≡

R
1+QS

Ai
The return on capital ρ ≡ R1+QS exceeds IMRS (by Q ≤

Ai−
BG
S
BG
and
(A6)).
From the aggregate demand for liquidity

LGi + α

LIi ≡ S

Ii
and the G bond market clearing condition,

LGi = B
G (by Lemma 4), we
obtain the amount of I bonds used for liquidity purposes:
α

LIi = S

Ii −B
G
where

LIi < B
I (by (C3)).
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Proposition 3: If the volatility of the I bond value and/or non-pledgeability/haircut
h are suﬃciently small so that condition (C1) is violated, and if the aggre-
gate quantity of safe assets BG +αBI is suﬃciently large so that condition
(C 2) fails to holds, i.e., if condition (C 3) holds, then I bonds are used only
partially for liquidity purposes, 0 <

LI < BI . Bond prices are q
∗
I = 1,
q∗G = Q > 1. The bond spread equals the liquidity premium carried by the G
bonds, q∗G − q
∗
I = l . Aggregate investment and credit are smaller than that
that would attain if the entire supply of I bonds would be used for liquidity
holdings,

I <
BG+αBI
S .
Table 3 below summarizes our results
Q

LI q∗G s
∗ q∗I Investm/Credit ρ
∗
Q ≤ χ BI χ s χ− s > 1 B
G+αBI
S ρ
χ < Q ≤ χ BI >

LI > 0 Q s < s∗ < s 1 B
G+αBI
S >

I > B
G
S ρ > ρ
∗ > ρ
Q > χ 0 χ s ≡ χ− 1 1 B
G
S ρ
where: s∗, ρ∗ are the equilibrium values of bond spread and return on
capital, respectively; Q is given by (7), that is
Q ≡
α+ h (1− α)
	
1− 1R


α+ h (1− α) S
R
Q > 1 and is increasing in I bond volatility (decreasing in α) and in
non-pledgeability/haircut h. And,
χ ≡

Ai −
(BG+αBI)
S −
h
R(1− α)B
I
BG + αBI + hSR (1− α)B
I
;
χ ≡

Ai −
BG
S
BG
;
s ≡ (1− α)

(q∗G − 1)

1−
hS
R

+ h

1−
S + 1
R

.
ρ ≡
R
1 + χS
; ρ ≡
R
1 + χS
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The third and the ﬁrst row of Table 1 summarize the results at Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2, respectively; the second row those at Proposition
3. Speciﬁcally, the second and the third row summarize the equilibria at-
tained when I bond volatility and/or the haircut h are suﬃciently great so
that condition (C2) fails to hold: The amount of I bonds used as liquidity
instruments is lower than the outstanding amount BI , that is

LIi < B
I ,
and aggregate investment falls below the level that would attain if the en-
tire amount of I bonds outstanding would be used for liquidity purposes, i.e.
I <
BG+αBI
S . The ﬁrst row summarizes the equilibrium attained when I
bond volatility and/or the haircut h are suﬃciently small so that condition
(C2) holds,

LIi = B
I , and

I = B
G+αBI
S
.
Credit expansion, real investment and return on capital are increasing
functions of the amount of liquid assets, the reverse holds for liquidity pre-
mia and bond spreads. The impact of I bond volatility on bond spread is
more relevant when liquidity is tight than when liquidity is abundant. In-
deed, the higher the liquidity premium, q∗G − 1, the greater the eﬀect of I
bond volatility (measured by 1−α) on bond spread. Thus "while a liquidity
premium is a form of risk premium, its structure is diﬀerent from that seen
in standard asset-pricing models. In particular, how the asset behaves when
liquidity is abundant is less relevant than how it behaves when liquidity is
tight" ( Holmstrom and Tirole, 1996). Moreover, in line with the empiri-
cal evidence provided by Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick (2012), the share
of safe/liquid assets is constant. This results from the proportionality of
aggregate investment and safe/liquid assets, that of ﬁrm/bank proﬁts and
investment, and the fact that ﬁrm/bank equity is the sum of the initial value
of equity Ai and proﬁts.
Liquid assets’ availability is determined by the amount of sovereign bonds
outstanding and crucially by the volatility of their market values. An in-
crease in volatility of I bonds (a reduction of α) produces the macro eﬀect
of depleting the aggregate amount of safe/liquid assets, BG + αBI , with a
corresponding increase of the liquidity/collateral premium q∗G − 1, and an
increase in the opportunity cost of using the I bonds for liquidity purposes
(the threshold qI(qG) lowers). As volatility increases, equilibrium shifts from
the ﬁrst row to the second row and for suﬃciently high volatility, the I bonds
lose the status of liquid asset — the equilibrium is deﬁned by the third row.
Parallel eﬀects are produced by an increase in non-pledgeability/haircut h —
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as h increases the opportunity cost of the unwarranted investment in date 1
idle liquidity that volatile assets entail, increases, and eventually the I bonds
are excluded from asset holdings for liquidity purposes.
4 Central Bank Liquidity Provision
Although the model is extremely simpliﬁed some observations can be made
with regard to the role of the Central Bank (ECB) in managing liquidity
needs, liquidity availability and credit.
Central Bank Lending Facility
In our model liquidity needs result from imperfect pledgeability of project/loan
returns. While the per unit outcome is y, only r < y can be pledged, that is,
R ≡ y− r is the "haircut" that market participants apply to projects/loans.
The smaller r, the greater the haircut and the bigger liquidity needs S = θ−r
per unit of investment/credit. The ECB’s policy of extending credit to the
banks accepting as collateral the bank loans matters only in so far the hair-
cut R′ it applies falls below the market haircut R. Suppose this is the case,
then banks REPO their loans with the ECB and their liquidity needs per
unit of assets (loans) drops from S to S′ = S−∆, ∆ ≡ R−R′. Bank’s credit
and return on capital expand, liquidity premia and bond spread shrink. The
larger the banking sector with respect to the non-ﬁnancial sector (i.e., the
larger the share of aggregate capital

Ai held by banks), the greater the
reduction of liquidity premia and bond spread and the greater the increase
in aggregate investment. A parallel eﬀect is produced by the ECB extend-
ing loans collateralized by sovereign debt securities with an haircut h′ lower
than the market haircut h. This lowers the opportunity cost of using the I
bonds for liquidity purposes (the threshold qI(qG) increases): the amount of
assets that are eligible for satisfying liquidity needs expand. However, if the
lending facility is restricted to the banks, as it is the case, the substitution
eﬀect towards the I bonds is limited to the banks: the banking sector ends
up holding the largest share of the I bonds outstanding.
Central Bank Deposit Facility
The deposit facility brings potentially a third safe/liquid asset into the
picture, albeit available only to banks. The rate at which deposits are re-
warded deﬁnes the date 0 price of one unit of liquidity at the future date 1,
qDF . The higher the deposit rate, the lower qDF . This asset is perfectly safe
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and hence, as far as banks are concerned, it constitutes a perfect substitute
for the G bonds. Whether this asset plays a role it depends on the price
qDF relative to the G bond price.
Suppose the deposit-facility rate is suﬃciently low so that qDF > q
∗
G ,
where q∗G is the market price of the G bonds in the absence of this third asset
(q∗G is deﬁned by Table 3, depending on parameter values). Then this asset
plays no role — banks’ liquidity needs are met by holding a portfolio of sov-
ereign debt securities. Now suppose the deposit rate increases suﬃciently
so that the price is q
′
DF < q
∗
G, then banks ﬁnd it proﬁtable to substitute
bond holdings with deposits at the central bank: Liquid assets’ availability
increases and with it credit and aggregate investment, while liquidity premia
and bond spread shrink. Indeed, credit and aggregate investment are maxi-
mized, liquidity premia and bond spread are minimized for q
′
DF ≤ q
∗
G, where
q∗G is the G bonds’ equilibrium price deﬁned in Table 1, once

Ai is re-
placed by the aggregate capital holdings of the non-banking sector,

ANBi
— the sector that cannot access the deposit facility, unless the deposits at
the central bank are made transferable (like "debt certiﬁcates").
Thus, by contrast to common wisdom, pursuing credit expansion as well
as bond-spread reduction requires an increase in the deposit facility rate
rather than deposit-rate cuts, and possibly the transferability of these claims
(ECB debt certiﬁcates). The key point is that liquidity holdings is an input
of the credit/investment process, and liquidity holdings is constrained by
the availability of safe/liquid assets. Deposit-facility rate cuts amount to
depleting the availability of safe assets. An indeed, the scarcity of safe
assets may give scope for the issue of ECB debt certiﬁcates, as the ﬁnancial
community points out (Kaminska, 2012).
The increase in the deposit-facility rate and/or ECB debt certiﬁcates
succeed in expanding credit and aggregate investment in that they de facto
expand the availability of safe assets, and thus lower the cost of liquidity
(the key input of the credit/investment process). The drawback is the in-
crease in the market yields of government debt, which means an increase in
governments’ cost of debt. We examine below a policy that does not have
these drawbacks and does not involve the subsidization which underlines the
eﬀectiveness of the ECB’s lending policies.
5 Debt Management: Secured Debt
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The I bond can be viewed as a bundle of two securities: a safe one that
pays α for sure, and a risky one that pays 0 with prob. p, and α− α with
the residual prob. 1 − p. For a liquidity seeking institution the safe com-
ponent is highly valuable, the risky component constitutes an unwarranted
ﬁnancial investment that subtracts resources to real investment undertaking.
Unbundling the security package improves welfare.
It amounts to tranching the debt so as to create a security whose safe-
ness is ensured by suﬃcient collateral (real assets and tax revenue). Specif-
ically, the former I debt is replaced by αBI safe securities that pay one unit
with strict priority, and BI "risky" securities that make the holders resid-
ual claimants — i.e., pay the holder (α − α) with prob. 1 − p, and 0 with
prob. p. These are tailored for "buy and hold" investors, and will be priced
qr = (1− p) (α− α), that is:
qr = 1− α (by (A2))
The safe security is a liquidity instrument, perfect substitute of the safe G
bond, and as such priced qsI = q
∗
G. The aggregate amount of safe assets
is BG + αBI , and bond markets clear for S

Ii = B
G + αBI , where
Ii =
Ai
1+qGS
. Thus,
q∗G : S
 Ai
1 + qGS
= BG + αBI ,
that is,
q∗G =

Ai −
(BG+αBI)
S
BG + αBI
( > 1, by (A5)) (13)
The revenue per unit of the former security bundle (the former I bond)
increases to qr + αq
∗
G, that is to q
u
I
quI = 1 + α (q
∗
G − 1) (14)
unambiguously greater than the revenue per unit of the security bundle (by
(14), (11)).
26
The spread between the liquidity instruments is nil, and aggregate in-
vestment/credit is determined by the supply of safe/liquid assets, BG+αBI ,
Ii =
BG + αBI
S
.
That is, aggregate investment increases whenever condition (C2) fails to
hold. And q∗G increases if (C2) holds (by comparing (13) with (10)). The
key is that unbundling the I bond security package so as to insulate the safe
component eliminates the unwarranted ﬁnancial investment in date 1 idle
liquidity that an I bond bundle entails. The greater volatility, the greater
date 1 idle liquidity, and with non-perfect pledgeability (positive haircut
h), the greater the amount of resources subtracted to real investment, the
greater then the opportunity cost of using the I bonds. With suﬃciently high
volatility, when condition (C2) fails to hold, in the equilibrium (described
by the second and the third row of Table 3), the amount of the former
I bonds used as liquidity instruments falls below the outstanding amount
BI , that is

LIi < B
I , and aggregate investment is lower than that that
would attain if the entire amount of I bonds outstanding would be used
for liquidity purposes, i.e.

Ii <
BG+αBI
S . Thus, when condition (C2)
fails to hold unbundling expands aggregate investment/credit. If condition
(C2) holds, unbundling has no eﬀect on the equilibrium level of aggregate
investment/credit — equilibrium aggregate investment is B
G+αBI
S
both with
bundling and unbundling (see the ﬁrst row of Table 3). However, with
unbundling the equilibrium price for liquidity, q∗G, increases - which means
that sovereign G’s cost of debt lowers. Indeed, under condition (C2), in the
bundling regime (with the former I bonds) qI = qI(qG) and for any given
price of liquidity, qG, aggregate investment/credit is

Ii =
ZBI+

Ai
1+qGS
,
where Z = −(1−α)h

1+qGS
R

< 0 (by (8) and (9)). Therefore, for any given
price of liquidity, qG, aggregate investment/credit is greater with unbundling
than with bundling. Since the demand for liquid assets is proportional to
investment/credit, the price q∗G that clears the bond market is greater with
unbundling than with bundling. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The B
curve depicts the demand for safe assets with bundling under condition
(C2), this is S

Ii, where

Ii ≡
−(1−α)h

1+qGS
R

BI+

Ai
1+qGS
. The U curve
represents the demand for safe assets with unbundling, that is S

Ii, where
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
Ii ≡

Ai
1+qGS
. Clearly, the market clearing price for liquidity, q∗G, is greater
with unbundling than with bundling — insulating the safe component of the
I bond increases the price for liquidity and lowers the cost of debt for both
sovereigns I and G.
Proposition 4: A debt management policy that insulates the safe com-
ponent of I sovereign debt beneﬁts the issuer, it reduces the issuer’s cost
of debt, and produces positive externalities: it expands aggregate invest-
ment/credit whenever condition (C 2) fails to hold, and lowers sovereign G’s
cost of debt if (C 2) holds.
Having assumed that the G bond is safe, pooling the G bond with the
safe component of I sovereign bond would still result in a safe security — the
equivalent of the European Safe Bond advocated by the euro-nomics group
for the multi-country euro-zone. Since the total amount of safe assets would
still be BG + αBI , the equilibrium would be exactly that derived above
(Proposition 4). European Safe Bonds, where safety relies on tranching and
collateral, are welfare improving. Interestingly, they beneﬁt the bullet-proof
nations too.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the interactions between the ﬁnancial and the real sector
in an environment where liquidity holdings is an input of the credit/investment
process. The supply of liquidity is constrained in that income pledgeabil-
ity limits inside liquidity, and not all sovereign debt is safe/liquid. We
have pined down the determinants of liquidity/collateral premia and bond
spreads, and with reference to the eurozone: (i) the implications of the ECB
policies on liquidity provision and credit, and (ii) the debt management pol-
icy that would increase welfare with no need for transfer payments. This
amounts to insulate the safe part of the sovereign risky debt — tranching
the debt so as to create a security whose safeness is ensured by suﬃcient
collateral (real assets and tax revenue). Such a policy increases welfare and
beneﬁts the issuer by reducing its cost of debt.
Having assumed two sovereign debts, G and I, pooling the safe G bond
with the safe part of I sovereign debt would result in the European Safe Bond
advocated by the euro-nomics group for the multi-country euro-zone. Our
28
analysis suggests that European Safe Bonds, where safety relies on tranching
and collateral, are welfare improving. Interestingly, they beneﬁt the bullet-
proof nations too.
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